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 The process of professionalization initiated by the Peruvian army in 1896 under 
French influence did not withdraw the military from political involvement. On the 
contrary, as the process of professionalization advanced, the army developed a 
“professional militarism,” that is, military political participation for reasons based on 
the institution’s professional ethos. The Peruvian army had traditionally claimed a broad 
military jurisdiction including extra-military roles. French instructors reinforced such 
claimed incorporating a broad military jurisdiction into the army’s professional ethos, 
which justified military coups during the twentieth-century as well as the Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980). 
 Historians Frederick M. Nunn and Daniel M. Masterson do not take sufficiently 
into account the impact of nineteenth-century militarism on Peruvian military thought. 
These scholars argued that Peruvian officers were aping their French mentors when 
twentieth-century military magazines claimed nation building as a defense prerequisite 
or when “Francophile” officers declared a civilizing and social mission for the army.  
However, in 1888, over 120 Peruvian officers established the Centro Militar del 
Perú and published the Revista Militar y Naval, which systematized the “military mind” 
born from the century’s military experience. The articles in the Revista demonstrate that 
before the process of professionalization initiated in 1896, the Peruvian military mind 
consisted of attitudes and perspectives stressing the necessity of a strong military, the 
supremacy of society over the individual, the destructiveness of civilian partisan 
politics, and a broad military jurisdiction, which included administrative, nation-
building, civilizing, and constitutional guardian functions. Consequently, this thesis 
 v 
focuses on nineteenth-century militarism and political culture arguing that by late 1880s 
the essential elements of the Peruvian military mind behind twentieth-century 
“professional militarism” had already come together. 
 
 1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 In 1968 General Juan Velasco Alvarado, commandant of the army and the Joint 
Command, inaugurated the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces (1968-
1980) after a so-called institutional coup had exiled the constitutional president. The 
self-defined mission of the new military regime was to find solutions for basic national 
problems as seen through the military ethos and with the consent and participation of 
the three branches of service.  
 Economic problems, demonstrations by land-hungry peasants, a demand from 
urban sectors for state services, denunciations of a petroleum contract harmful to 
national interests, and the failure of long-awaited reforms became the detonator of the 
1968 coup. The military administration tried to alter the country’s socioeconomic 
structures in accordance with a concept of national security that made economic 
development and modernization a necessary component of national defense against both 
internal enemies (i.e., Communists) and external enemies. The projected reforms 
included industrialization, a modern communication system, a redistribution of wealth, 
land reform, and the absorption of lower-class pressures by the political system – 
without direct popular participation or tolerance of political opposition. 1 
 The Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces has received widespread 
scholarly attention because it stands in opposition to the short-term personalistic or 
gendarme administrations established by military coups since independence in the early 
1820s. Peruvian scholars like Henry Pease and Julio Cotler have emphasized the post-
1945 era of accelerated industrialization and urbanization as the point at which the 
                                                 
1 Henry Pease García, El Ocaso del Poder Oligárquico: Lucha política en la escena  oficial, 1968-1975, 
15-17. 
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interests of the Peruvian armed forces and those of the agro-export and landed oligarchy 
separated.2   
Historian Frederick M. Nunn recognizes the importance of environmental 
factors in the 1968 coup, but stresses the evolution of military ideologically in the 
twentieth century. He argues that the French influence explains why dominant sectors 
of the Peruvian officer corps gradually developed the idea that it would be impossible to 
create a cohesive, disciplined social order and maintain a powerful military 
establishment under a civilian-dominated political system that generated only 
factionalism. 3  
Between 1896 and 1940, Peru contracted several French military missions and 
advisors to help modernize and professionalize the army not only to improve the 
country’s military capabilities, but to end the intervention of military caudillos in 
national politics. According to Nunn, French officers transmitted to their Peruvian 
officer-students their own thoughts about State, nation, and politics, which included the 
notion that army officers should play a broad role in society. French military 
professionalism emphasized authority, hierarchy, social responsibility, and the 
supremacy of national interests, while it scorned the excesses of individualism, 
egalitarianism, factionalism, and materialism allegedly brought to civilian society by 
liberal democracy and capitalism. In this light, the army stood as the perfect link 
between nation and State because it was a microcosm of society upholding collective, 
rather than factional, interests. The army united past, present, and future, harmoniously 
blending tradition and modernity by combining hierarchy and democracy into a sort of 
                                                 
2 Ibid., 21-41; Julio Cotler, Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú , 318-326. 
3 Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-
1940. 
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corporate democracy. Any man could advance through the ranks due to merit being 
completely equal to those sharing his rank, obedient to those above him, and leader to 
those below him. The army was a school of patriotism and the officer corps a vanguard 
of civilizing agents.4 
Examining the content of Peruvian military publications, Nunn establishes a 
correlation between the themes and topics they contained after 1904 and French military 
thought. He concludes that the pupils imitated the teachers. Absorbing French concepts, 
Peruvian officers became progressively disenchanted with the gap between republican 
political institutions, that supposedly should have guided the country toward progress 
and peace, and the country’s economic, social, and political underdevelopment. 
Convinced of the vital connection between development and defense, their own broad 
role in society, and the unsuitability of civilian institutions, Peruvian officers turned 
French military professionalism by the 1930s into a “professional militarism,” that is, 
the propensity to military-political action based on a professional ethos.5 
Although Nunn indicates that the professionalization initiated in 1896 under 
French influence formed a military mentality that remained unchanged by American 
military influence in South America after WWII, he limits his study to the 1896-1940 
period when French ideology took root in the Peruvian army. 6 Historian Daniel M. 
Masterson extends Nunn’s thesis to the late twentie th century by demonstrating the 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 22-23, 291. 
5 Ibid., xi, 2,136-37, 285. This work defines militarism as the lack of civilian control over the military, 
which actively participates in politics. 
6 Ibid., 251. 
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strength of French teachings in Peru’s military literature, its military institutions, its 
officer corps, and the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces.7 
 Nunn and Masterson, however, do not take sufficiently into account the impact 
of nineteenth-century militarism on Peruvian military thought. Indeed, Masterson 
dismisses it as simply the result of an unprofessional officer corps,  
By Samuel Huntington’s classic definition of military professionalism, . . . the Latin 
American military establishments of the nineteenth century were woefully amateurish. 
Without a sense of corporate identity built upon tradition, discipline, and institutional 
self-esteem, Latin American military men lacked a sense of responsibility to their 
profession and to their nation. 8 
 
The central argument of this thesis is that the main elements of Peruvian military 
thought that underlay the 1968 movement had their roots in nineteenth century domestic 
conditions and had coalesced by the early 1890s. In other words, the nineteenth century 
witnessed the evolvement of a “military mentality” that integrated the basic notions 
supposedly introduced by the French military missions. Explicitly espoused by over 120 
military officers in the late 1880s and early 1890s, this mentality included the criticism 
of political factionalism, a disdain of civilian values, the perception of the army as the 
only truly national and democratic institution, and a broad social role or civilizing 
mission for the officer corps. These officers, mostly from the army and including the 
surviving heroes of the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), formed an organization called 
the Centro Militar del Perú and gave voice to their ideas in a new journal, the  Revista 
Militar y Naval, the first issue of which appeared on 1 April 1888. 
                                                 
7 Daniel M. Masterson, Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero 
Luminoso . 
8 Ibid., 11. Samuel P. Huntington defines a professional officer corps in terms of its corporateness, 
expertise, and responsibility, see The Soldier and The State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military 
Relations, 7-18. 
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 The military mindset reflected in the Revista prior to the arrival of the first 
French military mission evolved out of nineteenth-century caudillismo and the political 
culture that encouraged it. Signs  of an ideological debt to Europe do appear clearly in 
the pages of the Revista, where Peruvian officers regularly discussed French and 
German military. However, the essence of this military mind had been formed by 
decades of military political involvement fueled by the contradictory political culture 
established after the end of Spanish authority.  
The republican political culture that emerged after the wars of independence -
that is, the assumptions, expectations, and behaviors relevant to the handling of public 
affairs - harbored contradictory elements defining unclearly the concepts of the new 
language such as popular sovereignty, public opinion, representative government, 
reason, egalitarianism, and freedom. For instance, if reason should guide society 
towards happiness, how could sovereignty reside in the people at large, being most of 
them ignorant? In this way, elitist and authoritarian ideologies coexisted with egalitarian 
notions to form the new constitutional language.9  The ambiguity of the criollo elite 
towards independence, its subsequent ideological disputes, and the breach between 
constitutional theory and reality created a political vacuum after the crumbling of 
Spanish authority. In the midst of this crisis of legitimacy, violence became the other 
side of the political coin, allowing and encouraging caudillismo.  
In this environment of institutional weakness and external military threat, army 
officers expanded the army’s jurisdiction, “a legitimate claim to apply its expertise to 
specific situations,” through three channels: (1) a legal channel, the law defining who 
could perform certain tasks, (2) public opinion, and (3) the actual performance of a task 
                                                 
9 Cristóbal Aljovín de Losada, Caudillos y Constituciones: Perú 1821-1845 , 73-119. 
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or exercise of authority. 10 Most Peruvian constitutions entrusted the armed forces with 
the protection of the political system, giving the military a constitutional political role.11 
Army officers, viewing themselves as agents civilization, also took on nation-building 
and administrative functions among their Indian troops or as appointed provincial 
prefects. Disgruntled urban sectors and political factions, moreover, often supported the 
seizure of power by different military caudillos, who thus could claim to be acting in the 
name of popular sovereignty and public opinion.  
By the 1880s, the army, with a military mind nurtured by the national political 
culture, was a professionalizing institution attempting to establish a broad jurisdiction. 
Although the nineteenth-century Peruvian army was not a professional one according to 
Huntington’s definition because of its lack of corporateness and expertise, as well as its 
interference in politics, the officer class regarded military service as a profession. After 
all, it was a full-time occupation serving society and was, too, a life- long calling - at 
least in the view of military practitioners. As recognized by different Peruvian 
governments of the 1800s in their attempts to established military academies, the career 
of arms required theoretical education and consisted of specialized knowledge.12  
Nineteenth-century Peruvian militarism provided important elements that, in 
conjunction with the process of professionalization under French tutelage, and 
environmental factors during the twentieth century, transformed military 
professionalism into professional militarism, which stood behind the Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces. Illuminating the origin of Peruvian professional 
                                                 
10 Don M. Snider and Gayle L. Watkins, “The Future of Army Professionalism: A Need for Renewal and 
Redefinition,” Parameters 30 (Autum 2000), 16.  
11 Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America, 6. 
12 Snider and Watkins, “Army Professionalism,” 13; Alfredo Muñoz, Las Escuelas Militares del Perú . 
 7
militarism provides a better understanding of the twentieth-century military behavior, 
which is crucial to any attempt to comprehend civil-military relations in that country.
 8
CHAPTER 2. THE COMING OF INDEPENDENCE 
The Inca Empire that Francisco Pizarro placed under Spanish rule in 1532 
extended from southern Colombia to northern Chile and from the Pacific Ocean to the 
Amazonian rain forest including most of Bolivia and northwestern Argentina. Such vast 
territory became the viceroyalty of Peru with Lima as its capital on the Pacific coast. 
Thereafter, other expeditions conquered the rest of South America, except for 
Portugal’s Brazil, expanding the viceroyalty.  
Spanish authority in South America lasted almost three hundred years sustained 
by a civil administration, the Catholic Church, and a military force. However, in 1808 
Spain fell to Napoleon, which ushered in a period of instability that would lead to the 
Spanish American wars of independence. A directive body called the Junta Central and 
later a smaller Council of Regency governed in name of the Spanish king, Ferdinand 
VII, defying French occupation. Liberal elements in Spain transformed the empire’s 
absolutist government, where the monarch ruled without interference from society, into 
a constitutional monarchy and summoned a Cortes or parliament with representatives 
from all over the empire. Delegates from the Americas wanted equal representation for 
the colonies in the Cortes, equality of access to public office for colonials, and the 
removal of mercantilist economic restrictions on agriculture, industry, mining, and 
trade. But the Regency simply could not grant Americans equal representation or free 
commerce, which would constitute de facto independence. Although sentiment in favor 
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of independence manifested itself in Mexico, Buenos Aires, Quito, and Chile, Lima 
could not commit to revolution. 1  
A sense of Peruvianism had existed since the late 1700s and found expression in 
certain organizations set up under Enlightenment influence and devoted to the study of 
practical aspects of local society. The activities of such organizations stimulated interest 
in Peruvian reality on the part of the criollo, or Peruvian-born white, elite and wer an 
important step toward the development of patriotic sentiment. But there was no 
consensus about what form a Peruvian patria should take. Most liberals in Peru believed 
the patria would benefit the most from a constitutional monarchy within the Spanish 
Empire while others, a more radical minority, advocated complete separation from 
Spain with a republican model. Absolutists, on the other hand, argued that Peru’s future 
depended on Spanish protection and the reversal of certain reforms introduced by the 
Bourbons. The only points of agreement among politically motivated Peruvians lay in 
their rejection of both freedom of religion and the participation of the racially mixed 
lower classes and indigenous peoples in politics. To complicate matters further, regional 
disputes between Lima and southern cities, Arequipa and Cuzco, flourished as 
possibilities of a political reorganization were considered.2 
The lack of cohesion among the Peruvian elite before, during, and after the war 
of independence in the 1820s set the stage for the political instability of the early 
republican era, which gave way to and nurtured caudillismo - the intervention of 
                                                 
1 J. R. Fis her, Government and Society in Colonial Peru: The Intendant System, 1784-1814, 201-203; 
Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of the Royal Government in Peru , 40, 47, 107; John Lynch, The Spanish 
American Revolutions, 1808-1826, 35-36. 
2 Lynch, Spanish American, 33, 162; Fisher, Intendant System, 233; Charles F. Walker, Smoldering 
Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840, 85; Fredrick Pike, The Modern History of 
Peru, 41-44; Paul Gootenberg, “North-South: Trade Policy, Regionalism, and Caudillismo  in Post-
Independence Peru,” Journal of Latin American Studies 23 (May), 273-308. 
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military chiefs in regional and national politics and resultant personalistic regimes.3 The 
sources of ambiguity and divergence within the Peruvian elite and the emerging 
national political culture that allowed the caudillos to thrive were diverse.  
Peruvian criollos shared a strong fear of social upheaval, which prevented many 
of them from committing to independence until Simón Bolívar and the Army of 
Liberation delivered it in 1824. That fear steamed from the fact that the white 
population of Peru, mostly concentrated in coastal cities, was numerically small vis-à-
vis the oppressed masses of Indian, African slaves, and mixed-blood.  
Although whites, Indians, and blacks were segregated, the neat social divisions 
soon blurred due to miscegenation. As the number of mixed-bloods increased, social 
tensions sharpened. Several different social categories, recognized in Spanish law, 
attempted to define the degree of whiteness, “indianess,” and blackness in each mixed-
blood individual. Nevertheless, cultural, social, and economic characteristics, in 
addition to race, determined the caste system. For example, an Indian who moved to the 
city and learned Spanish immediately became a mestizo - originally the offspring of an 
Indian and a Spaniard - and stopped paying tribute. A mulatto or free colored could buy 
a certificate of whiteness, which enabled him to join religious orders, schools, and 
marry whites. Thus, the possibility of social mobilization existed, fueling the masses’ 
pressure for social betterment.4 
Indians composed the majority of the population and resided mainly in the 
highlands. The viceroy, the king’s alter ego in the colonies, along with other judicial, 
                                                 
3 During the late nineteenth and twentieth century, the meaning of caudillo expanded to describe civilian 
or military dictators.  
4 Pike, Modern , 30; Lynch, Spanish American, 20-21; Julio Cotler, Clases, Estado y Nación en el Perú , 
33-39. 
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treasury, and high ecclesiastical authorities lived in Lima, which meant that the 
authorities closest to the native population were the corregidores or Indian agents and 
the caciques, or traditional Indian chiefs who mediated between the Indians and the 
Spanish authorities. During the seventeen century, the crown stopped paying salaries to 
these local authorities and authorized them to become traders and landlords. The 
corregidores utilized Indians, with the crown’s acquiescence, as free laborers and 
coerced buyers of the pricey, useless goods - called repartimientos - sold in their 
jurisdictions ; at the same time the agents circumvented colonial laws protecting Indian 
community lands and pocketed the extra money they collected from the Indian tribute.5 
The annual Indian tribute or head tax, the repartimientos, and the mita - 
compulsory labor for the government at mines, haciendas, or factories - forced the 
formerly self-sufficient native communities into the market economy. Alliances soon 
developed between local authorities and socioeconomic elites, including priests, 
hacendados, and merchants, to turn Indians into serfs through the mechanism of debt 
manipulation. For example, a new worker at a hacienda would receive a loan against his 
future wages in order to buy tools at the hacienda’s general store. Then he would recive 
most or all of his meager salary in chits redeemable only at the general store, a 
procedure that kept him in debt and at work since most haciendas had their own jail and 
enforced their own regulations.6 
But not only the masses pressed for social betterment. Upper class mestizos and 
criollos lived in the Spaniard social world aspiring to the same privileges enjoyed by 
peninsular-born whites (peninsulares), but became increasingly embittered when denied 
                                                 
5 Lynch, Spanish American, 8; Cotler, Clases, 26-27. 
6 Pike, Modern , 27-29; Rex A. Hudson, ed., Peru: A Country Study, 20-21,102-103; Cotler, Clases, 23-
24. 
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access to higher royal offices and other social distinctions because of their colonial 
birth.7 In this way, the criollo elite, although having some grievances of its own towards 
the Crown, had several reasons to fear a racial war if control over the masses weakened 
due to revolution. This fear increased as the minor, unorganized Indian revolts became 
more frequent and violent throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Economic reasons also weighted heavily in the lack of criollo commitment to 
independence. In the 1700 the French Bourbon ruling family replaced the Hapsburgs on 
the Spanish throne and initiated a series of administrative, economic, and military 
reforms to improve the economic and military position of Spain and her colonies so as 
to permit Spain to keep pace with the British. Bourbon worries about English 
commercial aggressiveness and possible territorial aspirations in Spanish America 
increased as Cape Horn’s invulnerability decreased.8  
In order to facilitate administration and improve the defenses of South America, 
the Crown created the viceroyalty of New Granada in 1739 and the viceroyalty of Río 
de la Plata in 1776 while Chile, as a captaincy general, became virtually independent 
from Peru. The addition of the silver-rich Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia) to the 
viceroyalty of Río de la Plata and the abolition of the fleet system jolted Peru’s 
economy, which had revolved around a monopoly on direct trade between South 
America and the mother country. As Madrid opened more ports in South America to 
imports from Spain, the Peruvian harbor of Callao could not compete with those on the 
Atlantic and Peru’s incipient manufacturing sector declined under the pressure of 
imported goods now coming through Buenos Aires and the loss of the Upper Peru 
                                                 
7 Lynch, Spanish American, 18, 159. 
8 Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru , 1750-1810, 9-10. 
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market. Peru, moreover, was forced to subsidize its new commercial competitors.9 The 
Peruvian criollo elite could not agree on a solution to the viceroyalty’s economic 
decline. Some argued for a return to the pre-Bourbon reforms while others claimed the 
reforms had not gone far enough in the direction of free trade. 
Most of the Peruvian elite, moreover, resided in Lima and did not own extensive 
properties, its status depend ing more on royal appointment. Consequently, although a 
small group of criollos had been influenced by the Enlightenment philosophers and 
sought political equality with Spaniards, economic autonomy, free trade, and better 
treatment of Indian, their socio-economic dependency on the Crown made them 
reformers and not revolutionaries.10 
In 1777, the Crown initiated drastic tax reform, abolishing various special 
concessions and taxing formerly exempt sectors of the population and economic 
activities. Exploitation of Indian increased as economic elites and corregidores passed 
on to them the new burdens imposed by royal reform. Tax revolts soon exploded all 
over the viceroyalty with criollo, mestizo, mulatto, and Indian participation due to the 
all-encompassing effects of the measures. Several of the newly introduced provincial 
militia units showed themselves either ambiguous - by not restraining the local mobs - 
or clearly opposed to the Crown’s interests by providing support to the rebellious 
citizenry. Consequently, a bitter debate about the loyalty and effectiveness of the 
provincial militia ragged throughout the viceroyalty.  11  
Hapsburg military policy had relied on regular or veteran Spanish forces and 
fixed fortifications as the first line of defense while keeping militias - mostly in the 
                                                 
9 Pike, Modern , 32; Anna, Royal Government, 4-7; Lynch, Spanish American, 13; Hudson, Peru, 18. 
10 Anna, Royal Government, 24, 30-32; Lynch, Spanish American, 18. 
11 Campbell, Colonial Peru , 73-74, 90-91, 99; Hudson, Peru, 27. 
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coast and composed of mulattoes - as a manpower pool. The expense of sending regular 
troops and raising fixed regiments in the colonies forced the Bourbons to introduce 
provincial militias, raised and manned locally, as tactical units in addition to a small 
regular and fixed component working mainly as trainers and command staff. 12  
The command of these provincial militias went to the most prominent criollo 
families capable of outfitting and raising troops. Provincial militia commandants 
received in exchange several distinctions such as membership in a Spanish military 
order and the military fuero - or exemption from the payment of certain taxes, from 
quartering soldiers, from the payment of jail cell fees, and in some instances from 
payment of tribute for officers and sergeants. Despite the Crown’s desire to fill all 
superior positions with noble elements that would balance the participation of Indians, 
mulattoes, and mestizos in the ranks, the creation of segregated units and the lack of 
enough white officers opened sergeant and lieutenant positions for mixed-bloods and 
colored people.13  
Even before the tax revolts, geography and economy had defeated the provincial 
militia experiment. The wide dispersion of haciendas and towns where militiamen lived, 
the lack of available and sufficiently paid training cadres, and the Crown’s innability to 
reimburse militia members’ economic loses during training all contributed to the militia 
problem. Nevertheless, the Bourbon military reform transformed the army into a more 
Peruvian institution. Although Spaniards dominated the provincial militia upper 
echelons, criollo and non-white militia officers outnumbered peninsulares.14  
                                                 
12 Lynch, Spanish American, 10; Campbell, Colonial Peru , 19, 23. 
13 Campbell, Colonial Peru, 35-40, 59, 190. 
14 Ibid., 53-54, 66-67. 
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On November 4, 1780 a young mestizo cacique, José Gabriel Condorcanqui, 
took on the alias Inca Túpac Amaru II and seized the Spanish Corregidor of Tinta in 
Cuzco. Accused of extorting the Indians in his jurisdiction, the corregidor was tried, 
sentenced, and executed a few days later by the Inca without militia interference. Lima 
sent its provincial militia and regular army under Spanish command to crush the 
rebellion in Cuzco since the militias of that region could not be trusted. Túpac Amaru 
proclaimed his movement to be against only “bad government” and corrupt Spanish 
authorities, but he could not control the masses of oppressed Indians who saw in all 
whites their oppressors. In April 1781, a criollo accomplice betrayed Túpac Amaru. The 
following month, the Crown put the heads of Túpac Amaru, his family, and some of his 
lieutenants on public display to discourage other would-be rebels.15   
In the wake of the rebellion, the Crown accelerated administrative reform, 
abolishing the repartimiento, establishing a high court of justice in Cuzco, and 
implanting in 1784 the intendant system. Eight salaried, Spaniard-born intendants, with 
extensive judicial, financial, and military authority, replaced the corregidores, many of 
whom had become financially independent, in order to centralize power, improve 
regional administration, and stimulate regional economies. Although the collection of 
taxes improved, the new system Heightened rivalries among public authorities, failed to 
supervise adequately the poorly paid subordinate officials who kept alive the illegal 
repartimiento, and, ultimately, could not reverse Peru’s economic stagnation.16  
The participation or ambiguous behavior of some criollos and mestizos during 
the tax revolts and the Túpac Amaru rebellion resulted in the Crown’s removal of non-
                                                 
15 Pike, Modern , 33-35; Anna, Royal Government, 29-30; Campbell, Colonial Peru , 111-115, 134-135, 
145-146. 
16 Fisher, Intendant System, 33-38, 47, 235-36; Lynch, Spanish American, 9; Pike, Modern , 31. 
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peninsular born whites from certain royal offices and the return to regular, fixed units as 
the first line of defense. In addition, criollos were passed up for military promotions and 
rewards. In this way, criollo loyalty was under suspicion and Peruvians saw their access 
to military and bureaucratic careers halted.17 Although this caused resentment among 
white colonials toward the Crown, the Túpac Amaru rebellion had stamped in their 
minds the violence that could be unleashed during a war of independence and the 
suffering awaiting whites who lacked the protection of royal troops. In 1814, another 
revolt with massive Indian participation aggravated criollo fears of a racial war. 
After 1809 several independence movements sprang up throughout South 
America. Viceroy José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa (1806-1816) raised militias to 
fight revolutionary movements in and outside Peru. The viceroyalty’s economic 
weakness and the lack of Spanish reinforcements forced him to give command to those 
criollos and non-whites contributing private funds to the war effort. Nevertheless, the 
army remained firmly in Spanish hands as Peruvians had limited access to field grade 
officer ranks, which inevitable deepened tension between peninsulares and criollos. 
Moreover, the mobilization was an additiona l blow to Peru’s economy as its mining 
sector collapsed in 1812 and Lima became dependent on Chilean wheat and other 
imported foodstuff. 18 
The liberal Cádiz Constitution of 1812 introduced a new vocabulary and a new 
way of political participation into the colonies. Sovereignty emanated from the people 
to create a representative government - a constitutional monarchy -, the constitution was 
                                                 
17 Campbell, Colonial Peru , 154-158, 164-166, 172-176; Anna, Royal Government, 30; Lynch, Spanish 
American, 11. 
18 Anna, Royal Government, 6-9; Campbell, Colonial Peru , 210-216, 223, 226; Lynch, Spanish 
American, 163. 
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an expression of a social contract established through reason rather than tradition, and 
all citizens were equal before the law. However, representation, popular sovereignty, 
equality, and liberty co-existed with socio-political hierarchies in corporate societies 
creating contradiction and unpredictability in times of revolution. 19  
Abascal’s successor, Viceroy Joaquín de la Pezuela, did not survive the political 
confusion coming from Spain. In 1814 the restoration of Ferdinand VII had meant a 
return to absolutism, but in December 1820 liberal elements in the Spanish army 
mutinied reestablishing the Constitution of 1812, which would be again abolished by 
the king almost three years later. The Spanish political instability in Spain weakened 
Pezuela’s absolutist position and after several military reverses culminating in the loss 
of Chile to the forces of José de San Martín, a young group of Spanish liberal officers 
bloodlessly deposed him on January 29, 1821 in favor of General José de la Serna. It 
seemed obvious for many criollos that the colonial government had started to crumble 
and that the independence was inevitable in view of San Martín’s control of Chile. 
Consequently, important segments of the elite, as well as those aspir ing to upward 
social mobility, decided that the time had come to bet on independence and ensure for 
themselves a position of future leadership.20  
From Chile, José de San Martín launched a costly Argentine-Chilean expedition 
towards Peru. San Martín wanted to rally Peruvians under the banner of freedom, which 
was the justification for separation from Spain, rather than occupy Lima and force it 
upon the citizens. He moved north of Lima besieging it with the help of the Chilean 
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navy and Peruvian montoneras, which were spontaneous guerrilla bands led by 
mestizos, Indians, and even criollos seeking vengeance, boot, or perhaps independence. 
Such groups acted without much coordination among themselves and at times in 
opposition to one another because of personal or regional disputes. 21   
 San Martín’s idea of a constitutional monarchy for Peru eased criollos’ fears of 
anarchy and social revolution. By May 1821 the north had pronounced itself for 
independence after the intendant of Trujillo, Marquis of Torre Tagle, joined San Martín. 
The viceroy evacuated Lima in July, deciding to concentrate royalist forces in Cuzco. 
The cabildo, or town council, invited San Martín into the capital after the viceroy left, 
primarily because they feared a slave revolt and the montoneras. San Martín officially 
proclaimed Peruvian independence on July 28, 1821, a pronouncement that roughed off 
an exodus of many loyal Spaniards and criollos, who abandoned property and family in 
Peru.22 
San Martín took care to involve the criollo aristocracy militarily and politically 
in the independence movement. In August 1821 he created the military unit Legión 
Peruana de la Guardia under the command of the Marquis of Torre Tagle, which is 
officially the founding unit of the Peruvian army.23 San Martín also organized the 
Sociedad Patriótica, a select group of criollos charged with deciding on the most 
suitable type of government for Peru, which developed into a politico- ideological 
battlefield. Plans for a republic met with no major opposition in Peru, for most of the 
staunch absolutists fled or been expelled and those favoring a representative 
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government in the form of a constitutional monarchy could not produce a Peruvian king 
to ease nationalist concerns. Consequently, the political debate occurred within the 
framework of republican theory and language.24  
By the time the new Latin American republics were writing their constitutions, 
the notions of the Enlightenment and the French and North American revolutions shared 
the spot light with those of post-revolutionary thinkers who feared Jacobean excesses 
and despaired over the challenges presented by republican states. Most Peruvian 
political leaders agreed on the virtues of separation of powers and a representative 
government, which was considered a sign of progress and civilization, where the rule of 
law would protect society and constitutional guarantees, such as the right to own 
property and free speech. A few, however, advocated freedom of religion; indeed, 
opposition to that particular liberal measure united an otherwise divided society. 25 
However, the divergent views of the proper relationship between state and society 
turned constitutional debates into ideological and civil wars.   
On one end of the political spectrum, “liberals” aspired to a democratic federal 
republic, with strong restrictions on the executive power. They favored an open trade 
policy and insisted on the reduction of rights granted to corporate groups such as the 
church and the army. On the other side, “conservatives” or authoritarians claimed that 
Peru lacked the cultural and structural development - namely, homogeneous cultural 
groups, literate masses, and a communication network - necessary for the successful 
functioning of federalism and democracy. They usually favored protectionist trade 
policies. Since most preferred a constitutional monarchy, they settled for a strong 
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central government that would prevent the anarchy of partisan politics and believed that 
a separation of powers and a free press would successfully counterbalance the 
executive.26  
Still, most liberals and conservatives differentiated between active and passive 
citizenship stipulating the necessity of literacy and property requirements for voting 
privileges and office-holding, measures that would impede the participation of the lower 
classes in politics.  In other words, they understood equality before the law - or civil 
equality - as separate from political equality.27 They shared a negative vision of the 
Indians based on their reliance on a subsistence economy and their “wasteful” ways 
during their several festivities throughout the year. Defining them as backward, lazy, 
stupid, and superstitious people, criollos deemed necessary the intervention of the State 
to turn Indians into productive citizens. Although liberals had more faith in the 
possibilities of civilizing the Indians through educational reforms and their insertion 
into the market economy, neither the liberal nor the conservative political platform 
incorporated the majority of the population as active political agents.28  
By mid 1822 severe economic, administrative, and military problems forced San 
Martín to seek Simón Bolivar’s cooperation. After his unsuccessful interview with the 
Liberator of the north, San Martín convened the first Peruvian constitutional congress 
on September 20, 1822, renounced his powers, and sailed for Europe.29 The electoral 
law stipulated that each of the nine departamentos -administrative units - should elect a 
number of representatives based on its population. Since four departamentos remained 
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in royalist hands, their representatives were elected among the citizens born in those 
regions living in Lima. All male citizens over twenty-one could vote, including Indians, 
although they could not be elected. Despite the apparent openness of the political 
system, a restricted group of urban criollos and mestizos controlled the electoral 
process. Several irregularities reported by contemporaries stand out, such as the case of 
a man who took eight or nine Indians from an open market to vote for him, becoming 
one of the three representatives from the departamento of Huancavelica.30 
In congress, mostly composed of liberal clerics and lawyers, the ideological 
cleavage was obvious. Electing three of its members to form an executive junta to direct 
the war, the delegates turned to the task of drafting the country’s first constitution. The 
military campaign directed by the Junta was a complete disaster and it was feared the 
viceroy would retake Lima. In February 1823 a group of officers headed by General of 
the Peruvian Army, Andrés de Santa Cruz, former royalist, forced congress to elect the 
aristocratic militia colonel and ardent separatist José de la Riva Agüero y Sánchez 
Boquete as the first president of Peru. 31 
These officers believed that the new republic needed a strong executive who 
could take secret and timely decisions during turbulent times instead of relying on a 
slow, indecisive legislative. With this bloodless coup, they bestowed upon the army a 
responsibility that reached beyond the military sphere. In the document by which these 
officers requested that congress elect Riva Agüero as president, they argued that the 
Junta had never gained the confidence of the population or that of the army. In addition 
to that document, a similar letter arrived from the militia garrisoned outside Lima, along 
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with one signed by several citizens criticizing the activities of congress. The coup and a 
more authoritarian form of government thus rested, or so its creators maintained, on the 
newly introduced notions of public opinion and popular sovereignty - employed, 
however, in a context of direct democracy.32 
The Peruvian officer corps, which originated mainly out of defectors from the 
realist army and militia, was composed of criollos and mestizos convinced that Peru and 
they themselves would do better outside the control and restraints of Spain. Many 
higher officers had received land as rewards for military services and joined the criollo 
aristocracy in wanting political power to shape the new state according to their vision of 
what was best for the country and themselves.33 The era of the caudillos had begun.  
In June 1823 Spanish troops recaptured Lima briefly and congress took 
advantage of the confusion to deposed Riva Agüero in favor of the Marquis of Torre 
Tagle. Congress then looked upon Bolívar’s envoy, General Antonio José de Sucre, and 
his Colombian troops for protection. Although military officers and politicians feared 
Peru would loose its still feeble independence under Bolívar and his confederation 
dreams, the situation seemingly left the legislators no other choice but to invite him to 
assume supreme military and political authority. Bolívar did so in September 1823 as 
congress suspended the newly promulgated liberal constitution. 34 
 In early 1824 unpaid Argentine and Chilean troops in Callao mutinied, giving 
the fortress to the royalists who again took Lima while Bolívar lay sick north of the 
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capital. Torre Tagle, his ministers, many notable criollos, and three hundred officers of 
the Peruvian army went to the royalist side. Many Peruvians had not signed the 
Declaration of Independence willingly, but had been guided by instincts of self-
preservation, so the same principle made it easy for them to change camps. Among the 
groups that willingly signed the Declaration were Peruvian-born nobles, criollo 
professionals, nonwhites championing reforms, and some import-export merchants 
advocating free trade. By 1824, the constant trade disruptions and demands for 
contributions from the patriot government had bankrupt most of them, while not 
bringing independence any closer – or so it seemed.35  
But Bolívar and his followers, including Peru’s future military caudillos, refused 
to give up. Placing all civilian matters on the hands of one prominent criollo, Bolívar 
concentrated on raising and training an army. The Peruvian navy controlling the Pacific 
coast made possible the arrival of fresh Colombian reinforcements who were 
incorporated into Bolívar’s multinational troops. Peruvians drafted from different 
northern areas, sometimes even twelve-year old boys, drilled constantly as new 
factories worked around the clock producing munitions by melting nails recovered from 
dismantled furniture. Gold and silver items obtained from the churches along with 
financial contributions imposed on the towns of the former intendancy of Trujillo 
produced by April 1824 an army of 8000 paid men and a sizeable great cavalry force.36 
  The next month Bolívar crossed the Andes to reunite with Sucre’s troops, the 
infantry unit under General José de la Mar (Ecuadorian), and the Army of the South 
under Generals Andrés de Santa Cruz (Bolivian) and Agustín Gamarra (Peruvian). 
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Meeting Spanish forces at Junín, the superior patriot cavalry sent the royalist army 
fleeing. Bolívar then moved toward Lima, entrusting Sucre with the Army of 
Liberation.  On December 8, 1824 the battle of Ayacucho defined Peru as an 
independent country. 37  
 Peru emerged from the long war of independence with a prostrate economy and 
a growing foreign debt. The loans contracted in the British stock market bought war 
materiel but did not revive the economy. The small internal market, the lack of ships, 
unavailability of capital, and disseminated labor force provided little incentive for 
investment in manufacturing. The high protective tariffs imposed by the commercial 
code of 1826 had, in reality, little national industry to protect. The weakness of the 
State, moreover, impeded the collection of such duties, thus encouraging corruption and 
contraband, which in turn undermined the protective and revenue functions of the 
tariffs. The new Peruvian oligarchy - including several high ranking military officers - 
contented itself with governmental positions and land, as the hacienda, utilizing 
inefficient and outmoded pre-capitalist ways of production but controlling people and 
territory, became the center of social, economic, and political power.38  
 The Bolivarian Constitution, calling for a centralized and authoritarian form of 
government with a lifetime president, was promulgated in late 1826 as the first step in 
the creation of the Confederation of the Andes. Many congressional and military leaders 
despised the idea of a foreigner ruling Peru, especially one who had annexed Guayaquil 
to the Gran Colombia (present Ecuador, Colombia, and Venezuela). Growing 
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opposition in Peru and political turmoil in Gran Colombia convinced Bolívar to 
abandon his confederation dreams as well as Lima. 39 
  The Constitution of Cádiz and the wars of independence brought into the 
colonies a modern republican language and praxis, which transformed the socio-
political panorama. However, these modern ideas coexisted with traditional 
authoritarian and corporate values creating a political culture marked by contradiction. 
For instance, the new Peruvian elite began the construction of a republican nation-state 
that excluded the majority of the population from active political participation, 
justifying their project with modern rational discourses. 40 No faction of the 
ideologically divided Peruvian elite, uncommitted throughout the wars of independence 
and fractionalized along regional lines, could establish itself as the new ruling class nor 
support a State accepted by most as the legitimate successor of Spanish authority. 
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CHAPTER 3. NINETEENTH-CENTURY CAUDILLISMO AND POLITICAL 
CULTURE 
 
 Nineteenth-century Peruvian caudillismo, a political system based on the 
leaders’ use of violence and patrimonial alliances to achieve power, had two great 
periods: the first one evolved from the war of independence and the second one from 
the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).1 During the first half of the century, economically 
weak ideological and regional factions fought alongside military caudillos to impose 
their view of the best organization for the new Republican State. By 1872, an 
economically strong social group, mainly coastal in origin and linked by family and 
business ties, established the Civilista Party, which successfully placed the first civilian 
in the presidency. The civilista platform consisted of a liberal economic program and a 
conservative political schema, settling the liberal-conservative debate. The War of the 
Pacific and the Chilean occupation ruined Peru’s economy leaving a political vacuum. 
With the civilistas debilitated, regional and ideological disputes ensued allowing a 
group of military officers and civilians grouped in the Constitutional Party to control the 
State. However, a coalition of the most influential civilian groups won the 1895 civil 
war initiating a period of consecutive civilian governments, which shaped the 
Republican Peruvian State during the twentieth century.  
The ambiguity of criollos during the war of independence, their economic 
weakness afterwards, the regional conflicts, and their ideological divergence impeded 
the formation of a ruling class capable of replacing the king’s legitimacy with a 
constitution. The emergent political culture exploited the confusing notions of reason 
and popular sovereignty on the one hand, and popular sovereignty, public opinion, and 
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representative government on the other. The republican language in Peru supported an 
elitist, antidemocratic discourse and, at the same time, a logic of “direct democracy” 
specifically during revolutions and counterrevolutions.2  
Popular sovereignty presumed equality of rights and obligations for all citizens 
while proclaiming reason, i.e., the capacity to think in orderly rational ways, to be the 
obvious propeller of a society towards social progress and peace.3 Most of the Peruvian 
population in the 1800s consisted of illiterate Indians and mestizos, the majority of 
whom did not speak Spanish but some variation of Quechua or Aymara. Peruvian 
Indians, with strong corporate values and engaging in subsistence economic activities, 
could not identify with the criollo minority or the liberal values upholding individualism 
and capitalism. The impossibility of allowing political sovereignty to reside in the 
Indian masses appeared obvious to many liberal and conservative political leaders alike. 
On the other hand, electoral processes marred by irregularities and violence 
called into question the legitimacy of representative government, making its 
relationship with popular sovereignty and public opinion problematic; thus, creating an 
ambiguous notion of authority. Each contending faction claimed to represent public 
opinion, possessor of political authority, against the abuses of the group in power, using 
the notion of popular sovereignty as in a direct democracy to justify revolutions. 
Accusing the faction in power of representing private interests rather than those of the 
“nation” or of introducing chaos in pursue of their selfish aspirations, the revolutionary 
groups argued that force became indispensable to defend the notions of popular 
sovereignty, peace, and liberty - in other words, the spirit of the constitution. However, 
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the superimposition of the egalitarian republican notion over Peruvian corporate and 
hierarchical society eroded the possibility of developing democratic political discourses, 
which created a gap between the theoretical principles of government and the country’s 
reality. Consequently, the idea of “nation,” “the people,” and “patria” did not involve a 
community of equal individuals, but incorporated, asymmetrical, different social 
groups.4 
Politicians and caudillos easily justified their participation in civil wars through 
the manipulation of the new republican language. Most Peruvian constitutions entrusted 
the armed forces with the protection of the political system and the maintenance of 
internal order. Besides, liberal constitutions, such as the first one in 1823, attempted to 
protect the individual from an abusive government by declaring that any governmental 
infraction against individual rights would break the social contract and justify popular 
resistance to oppression. Consequently, military officers could appeal to the constitution 
to justify their political interventions.5  
In addition, Peruvian constitutions provided for a state of emergency, or regimes 
of exception, “a legal and political order for times of crisis” such as natural disasters, 
rebellion, subversion, and war. During such periods, guarantees and liberties could be 
suspended. In fact, the war of independence inaugurated these temporary dictatorships 
when San Martín and Bolívar established them out of “the rule of necessity” or to 
protect the “public welfare.”  Interpreting the constitutional provisions for regimes of 
exception within a “direct democracy” logic and claiming faithful compliance with their 
constitutional mandate to defend the republic, caudillo-presidents resorted to 
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authoritarian measures without congressional approval while caudillos organized 
revolutions and counterrevolutions.6  
Although the constitution of 1828 declared that “the public force is obedient and 
cannot deliberate,”7 and the 1839 constitution stated that any attempts to legitimize 
revolutions by claiming to represent the “sovereign people” would be considered a 
criminal attack on “public security,” the interpretation of who represented the sovereign 
people inevitably lay with the triumphant caudillo.8 In this way, Peruvian constitutions, 
employing two competing set of principles, liberal and authoritarian, symbolized the 
contradictory Peruvian political culture.  
Revolutions using the “d irect democracy logic” followed these steps: first, 
caudillos justified their coup by accusing the group in power of threatening the nation’s 
interests; second ly, they declared the nation’s legitimate right to intervene through 
insurrection; thirdly, they claimed to represent public opinion, bearer of political 
sovereignty, during the national emergency; and finally, the caudillos arranged for 
elections to ratify the revolutionary actions and change their revolutionary status into a 
constitutional one.9  
Nineteenth-century revolutionaries saw themselves as saviors of the patria and 
did not escape the constitutional discourse in which political legitimacy derived from a 
representative government. Thus, each revolutionary group hoped that its violent acts 
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would inaugurate a legal and legitimate regime, based on a constitution representing the 
“spirit of the country,” and ending the political instability and the constant civil wars.10 
A broad sense of social responsibility towards the country alongside desires for 
personal glory and power, as well as different concepts of what was best for the 
country, encouraged military officers to participate in politics.11 The lack of a civilian 
group committed to independence turned the officer corps that supported San Martín 
and then Bolívar into the founding fathers of the Republic. The officer class saw itself 
as part of the only national institution incorporating all the different social sectors and 
presenting the perfect combination of tradition and modernity. The military’s sense of 
hierarchy and order coexisted harmoniously with the modern notion of equality, since 
every man was equal to those within his rank, leader to those below him, and obedient 
to his superiors. In this way, military officers stood as a source of order and stability 
with commitments that went beyond external defense to include an internal mission as 
well; the military man was called to protect the fatherland from anarchy. 12  
Such a sense of responsibility, however, did not preclude the flourishing of 
personal aspirations and interests since the army became an effective agent of 
mobilization for ambitious officers and soldiers from both upper and lower classes. 
Civilian factional leaders encouraged military intervention in politics because they 
lacked the force to gain access to, and remain in power. The possibility of a soldiers’ 
coup against their officer made the politicization of the troops important.13  
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The political vacuum and crisis of legitimacy following the war of independence 
encouraged unregulated political competition transforming violence into an essential 
part of politics, which nurtured caudillismo and the formation of a hybrid state utilizing 
modern bureaucratic and traditional patrimonial practices.14 
After independence, San Martín divided the country into departamentos, which 
in turn were subdivided into provinces, following the intendancy jurisdictions of the 
colonial era. Prefects and subprefects replaced the intendants and subdelegates. Political 
instability, constant border wars, and the economic weakness of the State promoted a 
high level of regional autonomy. The control of the State by a contending faction 
depended on the construction and maintenance of alliances that could provide capital, 
men, supply, and “popular support” during revolts and civil wars. Consequently, 
prefects, who led the departamentos and the resources, became key political players.15  
Presidents appointed prefects who, in turn, appointed subprefects and the leaders 
of the militias as established by law. In the early republic, most prefects were military 
men since they needed to protect the region from internal disorder –or the opposition- 
and possible external invasions. These posts were given as rewards to loyal followers 
who could raise a political and military support base in the region. For example, Bolívar 
appointed Cuzco-born General Agustín Gamarra as the first prefect of Cuzco. 
Subprefects oversaw the tax collection, producing roughly 40 percent of the State’s 
revenue and a higher percentage of provincial income. They also recruited soldiers, 
provided supplies in times of war, and circulated information while checking upon 
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political opponents. Militia leaders recruited and trained men while donating uniforms, 
horses, and arms.16  
Prefect, subprefect, and militia officer positions carried several benefits. Prefects 
wielded extensive influence because of their control of resources and could bargain with 
national caudillos on favorable terms or become a caudillo themselves. Subprefects had 
access to substantial amounts of capital yielded by the tax collection, which could be 
invested or loaned out for interest before payment was made to higher administrative 
levels. Militia leaders encountered various open avenues for local power, financial 
opportunities, and even commissions in the regular army.17  
 Most of the military caudillos who ruled the country in the first half of the 
century had held a prefecture. Caudillos organized multiclass alliances linking the rural 
population with national political ideologies and events. Caudillos coexisted alongside 
governmental institutions, manipulating them but without completely controlling them. 
Their power, based on shifting alliances and in constant dialogue with different sectors 
of society, suffered constant challenges keeping the states they built extremely 
vulnerable.18   
 In this way, the State functioned through modern, rational, bureaucratic 
practices established by the constitution, but at the same time through traditional 
patrimonial ways, as in the selection of regional authorities, who performed roles 
established by the constitution and others emanating from caudillismo. Moreover, the 
constant elaboration of new constitutions in the early republic - 1823, 1826, 1828, 1834, 
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1836, 1839 - that strengthened or weakened the executive branch, establishing a 
decentralized or centralized political administration, discouraged profound 
administrative reforms.  
Relations between the republican State and the native population clearly showed 
the coexistence of modern and traditional institutions. In 1825, Bolívar tried to 
transform communal Indian peasants into independent farmers by distributing 
communal lands. This liberal decree intended to assimilate the masses of Indians into 
the market economy and a criollo national society. 19 However, Indian communities 
successfully resisted the liberal “attack” due to the economic weakness of the State 
during the first half of the nineteenth century as well as their ability to insert themselves 
into caudillo politics. The Indian head tax, abolished and reinstated by Bolívar within a 
year, represented a huge percentage of State income while the leaders of Indian 
communities kept linking the payment of tribute to communal land rights as in colonial 
times. Tribute payment gave communal Indians certain assurances that their land would 
not be divided or lost to outsiders since regional authorities understood that the Indians’ 
ability to pay depended on their landed status. Thus, the maintenance of the colonial 
Indian head tax, crucial to the sustenance of the State and caudillo wars, gave Indians 
room for negotiation. However, at the same time, it kept alive perceptions of the social 
value of the native population dating back to colonial times. Criollos continued to 
describe Indians as lazy, drunk, and superstitious people who needed the intervention of 
the State to force them into the market and productive activities. Consequently, Indians 
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were not included within the politicians or caudillos’ political platforms as active 
citizens.20  
Liberal and conservative political practices differed little. Both groups 
conspired, relied on force and caudillos to control the State, and used republican notions 
in a “direct democracy” sense. Once in power, both groups tried to exclude the 
opposition from participating in the conduct of national affairs by favoring their 
followers and exiling their political enemies.21  The liberal and conservative maneuvers 
through or against the caudillos Generals Agustín Gamarra, Manuel Ignacio de 
Vivanco, and Ramón Castilla serve as examples. 
 Agustín Gamarra joined the royal army in 1809, fighting the rebels of Río de la 
Plata, Upper Peru, and Peru. However, after a change of heart in early January 1821, 
San Martín placed Gamarra, the mestizo and then army colonel who was from Cuzco 
and spoke Quechua, in charge of a battalion departing for the Central Andes. Despite 
Gamarra’s unimpressive military abilities, he participated in the Battles of Junín and 
Ayacucho, which sealed Peru’s independence. Bolívar promoted him to general and 
appointed him to the Cuzco’s prefecture in late 1824. As prefect, Gamarra utilized an 
authoritarian platform promising Cuzco its return to prominence. Although he could not 
establish complete local control because of liberal opposition, Gamarra astutely 
established a network of alliances in the region through his selection of subprefects and 
militia officers that enabled him not only to reach the presidency, but to become the first 
chief executive to complete his term on office.22  
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In 1829, a territorial dispute plunged Peru and Gran Colombia into war. Despite 
Peruvian control of the sea, land reverses stabilized the war. Peru’s weak economy 
suffered and support for the war and President La Mar, elected by the liberal-dominated 
congress, dissipated.23  
Gamarra dreamed of incorporating Bolivia into Peru and in 1828, while still 
prefect of Cuzco, he had invaded Bolivia during a time of political turmoil in that 
country, installing a Peruvian sympathizer as ruler. Gamarra had acted independently of 
President La Mar, a reflection of the weakness of the State in the early republic. When 
war broke out with Colombia the next year, Gamarra allied himself with the prefect of 
Arequipa, General Antonio Gutiérrez de la Fuente, to rid Peru of the weak La Mar.  
Gamarra accused the president, born in Cuenca, Ecuador, part of the Peruvian 
viceroyalty during the early 1800s, of forcing the country into a disastrous war due to 
his personal ambition of reuniting southern Ecuador with northern Peru. Thus, Gamarra 
accused La Mar precisely of what he himself desired for the south. 24 
 As La Fuente took charge of the government in Lima, Gamarra, also in charge 
of the Southern Army, enlisted the support of several military officers to force La Mar 
to resign his command and the presidency in June 1829. Gamarra and La Fuente 
justified the coup by invoking the right of the officer corps –or part of it- to represent 
public opinion in the execution of “necessary” actions to save the fatherland. Thus, 
military officers assigned to the army, a microcosm of Peru, and its officers a broad 
responsibility towards the patria. Thus, La Fuente took control of the State in the name 
of a “moribund nation” after listening to the “voices of the nation and the army.” In his 
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message to the newly installed congress the next month, La Fuente stated that his 
“mission had proceeded from an origin as pure and noble [as that of congress]: the 
public call, the national sentiment that pronounced itself for the salvation of the 
fatherland.”25 
Gamarra won the first popular indirect election of 1829, as established by the 
liberal constitution of 1828, becoming a constitutional president. Since congress waived 
the literacy requirement for voting, all adult males, including Indians, cast ballots. To 
resist the several revolts against his administration from domestic opponents and from 
the Bolivian president, Andrés de Santa Cruz, who wished to incorporate at least 
southern Peru to Bolivia, Gamarra resorted to caudillismo and patrimonialism.26 In light 
of the weakness of the State, he strengthened Peruvian patrimonial tendencies. During 
revolts and civil wars, military strength depended on regular and militia units, as well as 
montoneras. Loyal military officers enjoyed promotions and rewards, while officers 
opposing him ran the risk of losing their commissions.27 Militia officers gained access 
to army commissions or business opportunities since most militia commanders were 
also businessmen providing uniforms and arms to their units. Gamarra also rewarded 
loyal officers with prefectures, according them a great deal of autonomy in exchange for 
their support. Cuzqueño Indian communities received tax cuts in return for their 
military services in montoneras. As a result, the state Gamarra built did not fortify 
republican institutions and weakened the foundations of military discipline, encouraging 
the politicization and factionalism of the officer corps.28     
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Most conservatives supported Gamarra’s authoritarianism without being 
necessarily gamarristas. Several periodicals in cities such as Lima, Cuzco, and 
Ayacucho defended the effectiveness of a strong executive. The editors, voicing their 
doubts about the efficacy of congress, claimed that the maintenance of order should 
supersede the importance of individual liberties. Conservatives such as José María de 
Pando and Colonel Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco argued that an authoritarian political 
system with an “aristocracy of knowledge” ruling the country suited Peruvian reality, 
whereas the liberal theories were utopian.29  
During his administration, Gamarra could not invade Bolivia because of 
opposition from a liberal congress. However, Bolivian president Santa Cruz ruled the 
Peru-Bolivia Confederation from 1836 to 1839. After the chaotic events defeating the 
Confederation, Gamarra ruled the country fo r a second time until his death in late 1841 
while invading Bolivian territory. 30 During Gamarra’s second administration the 
conservative constitution of 1839 replaced the 1836 confederate constitution. It 
reinforced the executive power by extending the presidential term to six years. 
Presidents could not be impeached for breaches of the constitution, a situation that 
Gamarra faced during his first administration, unless they attacked the independence or 
integrity of the country. The new constitution also suppressed the regional 
administrative organisms created by the 1828 constitution. The electoral law of 1839 
maintained the indirect system and established both income and literacy requirements 
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for voting, although it waived them until 1844 for Indians and mestizos. The law also 
set a minimum income for aspiring presidents and congressional representatives.31   
The constitution of 1839, however, did not appear sufficiently conservative to 
some conservative groups. Colonel Manuel Ignacio de Vivanco, prefect of Arequipa, 
revolted in 1841 and, after attaining the rank of general, again in 1843 claiming the 
necessity of an even stronger executive.32 Successful the second time, Vivanco, an 
aristocrat and intellectual, became Peru’s “Supreme Director.” In February 1843, the 
“people” of Arequipa issued a public manifest calling for him to take charge of the 
government. The General replied, “Honor, patriotism, and responsibility forced me to 
listen to the population . . . I, Peruvians, will forget my personal goals to obey your 
commands.” The Director closed congress, claiming it necessary to reduce disorder and 
disunity arising from “personal ambitions” of the legislators - that is, liberals opposing 
his authoritarianism. He wanted to establish, said Vivanco, the rule of a young, 
educated, and moral elite.33 
Despite Gamarra’s conservatism, he tended to appoint moderate politicians 
rather than extreme conservatives. Military caudillos often mediated between extreme 
liberals and conservatives, who tried to remove all members of the opposition from 
governmental positions. General Ramón Castilla represents the best example.34 
Ramón Castilla, a mestizo from the southern region of Tarapacá, remained a 
royalist officer until 1822 when he joined San Martín, organizing the cavalry that 
delivered victory at the Battle of Junín. In 1834, Castilla became prefect of Puno. 
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During the Peru-Bolivia Confederation, he escaped to Chile and joined Gamarra’s effort 
to expel Santa Cruz from Peru. Castilla defeated Vivanco’s authoritarian model in 1844 
with liberal support, acquiring the surname “Soldier of the Law” and the presidency in 
1845.35 Although Castilla fought alongside liberals against extreme conservative 
groups, he employed authoritarian and conciliatory measures toward his political and 
personal enemies to remain in power, becoming the second president to complete his 
term in office. Even though Castilla claimed to respect the constitution, on occasion he 
broke the law, rationalizing his actions as necessary to preserve the most vital national 
interest of internal order.36   
Castilla and his liberal allies utilized republican notions within a logic of direct 
democracy to justify their revolutions. However, like Vivanco’s group, radical liberals 
attempted to rid the government of any political opponents whereas Castilla recognized 
the necessity of incorporating the political opposition in the running of the country as a 
way to stop them from plotting constantly, a disagreement that soured Castilla’s alliance 
with the liberals.37 
When General José Rufino Echenique succeeded Castilla, it marked the first 
peaceful succession in Peruvian history. In late 1853, however, tensions between Peru 
and Bolivia grew as embezzlement accusations shook the Echenique administration and 
the president himself. Sensing the moment ripe for revolution, Vivanco’s followers in 
Arequipa revolted in January 1854, arguing that the corrupt central government did not 
listen to the popular demand to avenge Bolivian insults. Taking advantage of Vivanco’s 
exile in Chile, Castilla shaped the Arequipa movement along liberal ideals, supervising, 
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for example, the abolition of slavery and the Indian head tax during the civil war. Early 
in 1855, Castilla defeated Echenique’s forces near the capital and established a 
provisional government. His liberal ministers suspended the citizenship status of all 
governmental officials and military officers who had not aided the “popular cause” and 
removed them from their jobs. The new government then issued a decree, as Gamarra 
had after defeating Santa Cruz and the Confederation, denying pensions to the 
dependents of military personnel who had died defending the constitutional government 
of Echenique.38  
Castilla’s appointment of moderate liberal and conservative ministers created a 
schism between the executive and the triumphant radical liberals. Serious disagreements 
arose over the necessity of replacing the Indian head tax with a “personal contribution” 
by every male over twenty-one years of age and the Amnesty Law pardoning most 
officials and officers who had fought on Echenique’s side. Meanwhile, congress 
promulgated the liberal constitution of 1856, which reinstated regional governments, 
annulled the private military and ecclesiastical fueros, and reduced the presidential term 
to four years. Although it canceled the electoral colleges, thus establishing direct 
elections, the vote remained restricted to the literate, those owning a workshop, or 
military personnel. Moreover, the constitution declared that congress would determine 
the size of the armed forces and approve the promotions from mayors up. It also 
proclaimed that the duty of the armed forces was to protect the constitution and not an 
arbitrary or despotic executive.39 Castilla protested civilian meddling in military affairs, 
arguing tha t members of the armed forces owed obedience to military regulations, a 
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stance that worsened his relations with the liberal congress. In November 1856, 
Vivanco revolted again from Arequipa. In the midst of the civil war, congress decreed 
that as soon as the government pacified the country, the provisional president should 
call for general elections. According to the new constitution, no one occupying the 
presidency could present his candidacy. In this way, the liberals attempted to rid 
themselves of Castilla. As Castilla fought Vivanco’s forces in the south, Lieutenant 
Colonel Pablo Arguedas dissolved ongress, arguing that Peru’s fate depended on 
Castilla’s control of the State. Arguedas insisted that, after listening to the “nation,” he 
had “sacrificed” himself and used the army to act on behalf of the people. Although 
Castilla boasted that congress and the constitution could have been reformed peacefully, 
he conveniently accepted Arguedas’ actions as a fait accompli. A new congress 
promulgated the moderate constitution of 1860, which kept the four-year presidential 
term, reinstated the indirect vote for males over twenty-one years of age who were 
literate, owned property, or paid taxes. Congressional authority over military 
promotions could involve only generals and the armed forces owed obedience to 
military laws and regulations. The appointment of prefects and subprefects remained the 
president’s prerogative. After defeating Vivanco in 1858, Castilla won the presidential 
elections.40 
After mid-century, the characteristics that had defined the early republic 
changed. As the central State reduced its dependency on the Indian head tax due to the 
boom in guano production, a structured civilian group with its own ideology surfaced. 
Guano, an agricultural fertilizer rich in phosphates had accumulated for decades on 
Peruvian isles, acquired notoriety in Europe during the 1840s. Foreign commercial 
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firms exported the product in consignment due to the absence of national capitals and 
the government’s lack of funds. These consignees paid the costs of collecting, 
transporting, and marketing the guano, sharing the net profits with the Peruvian 
government. The substantial and steady guano profits had several consequences: 
increased State centralization, the preeminence of Lima, the birth of a strong new 
civilian group, a worsening of Indian conditions, and, paradoxically, the bankruptcy of 
the state.41  
The guano profits reduced the central government’s dependence on the Indian 
head tax, allowing for more centralization and less negotiation with regional interests. 
The abolition of the tax in 1854 during the liberal revolt against Echenique reduced 
local governments to economic dependency upon the Lima bureaucracy. The 
suppression of the tribute, coupled with the abolition of the curaca office –Indian chief-, 
undermined the communities’ ability to negotiate with local authorities when Indian 
communal lands became under attack during the second half of the century.42   
The first administration of Castilla initiated the consolidation of the internal 
debt, which included loans and damages incurred by private interests during the war of 
independence or civil wars up to 1845, as a way to encourage the formation of national 
capital. The vagueness of the consolidation laws resulted in illegitimate claims for 
millions during the Echenique administration as well as the collection of promissory 
notes by a few powerful individuals.43  
The consolidation of the internal debt and the manumission of slaves, decreed 
during the liberal revolution of 1854, resulted in compensatory payment to slave 
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owners, which created a moneyed class and strengthened the financial position of many 
existing groups. By the early 1860s, the families who benefited from government 
payments had become important investors in guano and coastal plantations of cotton 
and sugar. In 1860, congress enacted an earlier congressional resolution declaring the 
preference of Peruvian citizens as consignees, so new contracts replaced the old ones 
although Peruvians usually had foreign partners. The Compañía Nacional de 
Consignación, led by Manuel Pardo y Lavalle, took the English market in 1862. The 
newly formed plutocracy, coastal and Limeñian in origin, with interests in guano and 
agricultural exportation, also replaced the foreign cons ignees as the government’s 
financier, participating in the opening of national banks by 1863. This plutocracy, 
linked by family and business ties, imposed the primacy of Lima over the northern and 
southern regions.44  
 The elections of 1871 were significant because they saw the formation of the 
Sociedad Independencia Electoral, eventually labeled the Civilista Party. The party, 
formed by distinguished civilians and military officers, represented the merger of the 
old aristocracy and the new capitalists, and supported the candidacy of the ex-consignee 
Manuel Pardo y Lavalle to the presidency. 45 The Civilista Party, relying on a complex 
national organization and modern campaign techniques, overcame the liberal-
conservative political dichotomy by formulating a moderate, practical program of 
national development that favored an agro-export economy, the supremacy of the coast 
and Lima, firm rule by the talented, a paternalistic view of the Indian population, and a 
small, professional army under civilian control. Civilistas differed from the liberals in 
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their lack of obsession with such things as weakening executive powers, the extreme 
monitoring of the army by congress, and the supreme importance of individual 
guarantees. Pardo counted on vast popular support in Lima and other cities due to his 
1868 work as president of the Charity Society and his 1869 performance as mayor of 
the capital. He also visited Lima’s poorer neighborhoods and traveled outside the 
capital delivering speeches. He enjoyed also the support of the consignees, bankers, and 
merchants, as well as the majority of the capital’s university youth and professors. The 
Civilista party represented in 1871 the young, the bright, the rich, and the poor; it was a 
new alternative to militarism and the old politicians.46 
The war of independence and the country’s acephalous condition thereafter gave 
rise to the first militaristic moment, which died with its maximum representative, 
Castilla. By 1871, most of the heroes of the war of independence had disappeared and a 
new civilian group had emerged to control the State. The failed revolt by the Secretary 
of Defense, Colonel Gutiérrez, who asserted the necessity to defend the armed forces 
and the patria from an antimilitaristic civilian, had counted neither with popular support 
nor the backing of significant elements of the military.47    
In 1872, Pardo became the first civilian president of republican Peru. He 
endured several revolts and assassination attempts from conservatives, from Nicolás de 
Piérola and the southern interests, from Iglesias and the northern interests, and from 
some elements of the military. Pardo reduced the size of the military, leaving many 
former officers and soldiers unemployed. In addition, he launched a program of 
professionalization that reduced the possibility of enlisted men’s becoming officers 
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without attending a military school while others saw their personal interests or those of 
the patria in danger if the armed forces withdraw from the political arena. Nevertheless, 
several military officers supported Pardo’s attempt to professionalize the officer corps 
and the noncommissioned officers, defending his regime against the constant 
uprisings.48 
Despite the guano profits, the State remained unable to balance the national 
budget. The lack of an effective tax system, the constant internal wars, the debt burden, 
and a war with Spain in 1866 bankrupted the State, forcing different administrations to 
ask the guano consignees constantly for cash advances against future profits. During the 
civilista administration, the economic situation worsened leaving the party without 
realistic possibilities for the next presidential elections. Instead of placing itself in the 
opposition, the party decided to support a viable government while aiming for 
dominance in congress and other organizations. In 1876, General Mariano Ignacio 
Prado succeeded Pardo. As the economic conditions worsened, the War of the Pacific 
erupted.49  
The devastation brought on by the war and the imprisonment of the civilistas 
and other prominent leaders created a political vacuum, fueling regional disputes that 
were reminiscent of the war of independence. However, the second militaristic moment 
of the nineteenth century sprang from defeat rather than victory. The republican State 
had relied upon a succession of makeshift coalitions that had fostered political 
instability and socio-economic backwardness. The relative pacification and 
centralization achieved by Castilla in the 1850s and 1860s reduced the number of costly 
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civil wars but did not eliminate the constant conspiracies and revolts or the necessity to 
establish regional alliances with prefects and military commanders.  
By 1879 Bolivia and Chile had long-standing boundary disputes. In addition, the 
coasts of Bolivia were rich in saltpeter, business in which Chilean capital was 
prominent. Peruvian interest in this conflict, besides upholding the principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes, was very specific: protect Peru’s territorial integrity against 
Chilean intrigue. Chile had tried to bribe Bolivia with the southern Peruvian territories 
in exchange for relinquishing most of the Bolivian coast to Chile. Bolivia had no navy 
and Peru feared a Bolivian-Chilean attack if no other option was there for Bolivia. In 
this light, Manuel Pardo had signed a secret alliance with Bolivia in 1873.50 
In February 1879, Chile invaded Bolivia provoking a declaration of war by La 
Paz. Chile demanded Peruvian neutrality and declared war in April when Lima balked. 
The lack of external credit and the state of war impeded the acquisition of armaments 
and vessels. During the civilista administration, congress had approved a credit of four 
millions for the construction of two armored ships in order to maintain naval parity with 
Chile, but the financial crisis prevented implementation of the plan.51 The naval 
campaign lasted from April to October 1879, with Peru using over twenty-year-old 
vessels. In November, the land campaigns started with the Chilean disembark in 
Peruvian territory. The southern campaigns, Tarapacá and Tacna, concluded in 1880 
with the destruction of most of the regular army and the disintegration of the Bolivian-
Peruvian combined front. Politically, both Bolivia and Peru changed leaders during 
these campaigns. Nicolás de Piérola became the Peruvian dictator after General Prado 
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left the country in secrecy to proceed with armament dealings in Europe while a popular 
uprising elevated General Narciso Campero to the Bolivian presidency. 52 
In April 1880, the land campaign of Lima started with the blockade and 
bombardment of the port of Callao. Several bombardments along the central and 
northern coasts occurred since September. The Peruvian survivors of the southern 
campaigns joined the inexperienced units formed in Lima, which lacked weapons, 
transportation, and provisions. By January 1881, the Chilean army had captured Lima 
and Piérola escaped to the highlands to organize the resistance.53  
When Chile refused to deal with the Dictator, a group of Limeñian notables 
established a provisional government. As Piérola lost support, he left the country for 
Europe trying to avoid a civil war. However, Chile deported the provisional president 
due to his attempts to negotiate a contract that would allow Peru to offer Chile an 
economic retribution instead of territorial yie lding. 54 Meanwhile, General Andrés 
Avelino Cáceres started a fierce guerrilla resistance against the Chileans in the central 
highlands. Cáceres had supported Castilla during the 1854 revolution, fought in the 
1866 War against Spain, and stopped a sergeants’ revolt against Pardo in 1874. When 
the War of the Pacific broke out, Cáceres, who participated in every campaign, was a 
colonel and prefect of Cuzco. Between 1882 and 1883, Chilean authorities tried 
unsuccessfully to capture Cáceres, known as the Brujo de los Andes (Andean Wizard), 
who gave hope to many Peruvians that a counterattack remained a possibility.55  
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However, the northern hacendado, General Miguel Iglesias, who received his 
commission as colonel from Piérola after raising a military unit, considered peace at any 
cost to be indispensable to national reconstruction. Consequently, Iglesias in 1882 
convoked a northern congress, which elected him “Regenerator.” Chile recognized and 
supported Iglesias, who consolidated his dominion in the north after Chilean troops 
defeated Cáceres’ montoneras in July 1883. Iglesias signed the Treaty of Ancón, 
permanently ceding the southern province of Tarapacá, rich in saltpeter, to Chile and 
accepting the temporary cession of the provinces of Tacna and Arica.56 
Cáceres, who considered Iglesias a Chilean puppet, emerged as the greatest 
living hero of the war. In 1885, The Wizard defeated the iglesistas troops in the central 
highlands and entered Lima with general popular support. Iglesias left the government 
in hands of a provisional cabinet, which convoked general elections in 1886. Cáceres 
won the elections, but he did not participate in politics as Gamarra or Castilla had. On 
the one hand, Cáceres organized the Constitutional Party, conformed by civilians and 
military personnel. 57 On the other, he attempted the transformation of the officer corps 
into a political pressure group.  
Like Gamarra, Cáceres tried to control the army to solidify his power, but he 
maneuvered for an ideological control in addition to patrimonial practices. The Wizard 
wanted an effective army; thus, he reopened the military school for cadets and the 
center for noncommissioned officers established by Pardo before the war.58  Cáceres, 
however, also wanted an ideologically homogeneous officer corps. The 
professionalization process that Cáceres envisioned would not stop military officers 
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from participating in politics; it would stop them from caudillista practices. With an 
officer corps united under an independent ideology, an officer would never again lead 
his troops against another in support of partisan civilian political pursuits. The post-war 
officer corps should become a pressure group and its members should participate in 
politics through institutional channels, such as political parties. To accomplish these 
goals, Cáceres created the Constitutional party while his vice-president, Colonel 
Remigio Morales Bermúdez, presided over the Centro Militar y Naval founded in early 
1888.59 Cáceres’ reconstruction project relied on authoritarian practices and the 
strengthening of the armed forces, always maintaining the constitutional façade. The 
war had witness the patriotism and heroism of soldiers and sailors; thus, several officers 
claimed for the military institution role of spearhead in the regeneration of the country. 
Cáceres and his entourage summed up the republican political culture and the military 
experience of the nineteenth century; they embodied the essence of the Peruvian 
military mind. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE MILITARY MIND 
Whereas Peruvian defeat in the War of the Pacific set the stage for the beginning 
of the second militaristic moment of the nineteenth century, the war’s greatest living 
hero took the leading role. Cáceres embodied military thought fashioned by the 
nineteenth-century political culture and caudillista experience. Like Bolívar and 
Castilla, Cáceres believed that republican and liberal institutions in Peru could flourish 
only within an authoritarian political system. Ironically, liberty needed the protection of 
an authoritarian executive capable of bending the law when necessary. Unlike any other 
caudillo, Cáceres had absorbed the lessons from the civilista experience of the 1870s 
and the War of the Pacific.  
Throughout the 1880s, scholars, politicians, military men, and citizens in general 
attempted to understand what had made possible Chile’s swift victory. Fingers pointed 
to Peru’s republican history, that is, the lack of nation cohesion and state-building. The 
behavior of the oppressed social sectors during the war particularly impressed 
politicians and military officers. Several Indian communities refused the payment of 
forced contributions established by Chilean authorities arguing that they did not form 
part of Peru. Chinese laborers, enduring semi-slavery conditions, and part of the black 
population engaged in the destruction of property. 1 Some civilian sectors blamed the 
lack of national integration on the military and its constant involvement in civil wars, 
while military officers condemned civilian partisan politics. Cáceres’ project for the 
reconstruction and development of the patria required his party’s control of the state 
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through a strong executive, the minimization of political opposition, and the support of 
an expert, united, and disciplined military institution.   
The Constitutional Party’s easy victory in the 1886 elections, a result of the 
Wizard’s popularity, propelled Cáceres into the presidency. With the civilistas 
impoverished and Piérola’s revolutions on hold, political opposition during Cáceres’ 
first term of office remained low. However, his administration did not shy away from 
some “necessary” unconstitutional actions such as the replacement of some 
uncooperative congressmen before their term of office was over.2  
In the 1890 elections, the Constitutional Party supported the candidacy of 
Colonel Remigio Morales Bermúdez, Cáceres’ first vice-president, who had 
participated in Castilla’s 1854 movement and Cáceres’ resistance in the War of the 
Pacific. The civilistas, previously had supported the Constitutional party, but now 
presented their own candidate. Piérola, backed by the Democratic Party, organized six 
years earlier, and enjoying widespread popular support, represented a third option 
between a Lima-centered oligarchy and a military one. Just before the elections, 
Cáceres maneuvered to remove Piérola subjecting him to a military tribunal charged 
with poor direction of the war. After a controversial congressional revision of the votes, 
Morales Bermúdez assumed the presidency. 3 
Morales Bermúdez’s administration also resorted to unconstitutional actions to 
remain in power and ensure the Constitutional Party’s control of the state. In December 
1890 a failed revolt led by Colonel Arturo Morales Toledo concluded with the summary 
execution of twenty-two individuals. In the 1894, the chief executive closed several 
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weekly newspapers opposed to the Cáceres candidacy for reelection and nullified 
municipal elections because the Constitutional Party had lost control of them. “You 
have sacrificed principles and laws, which are the soul of a nation, not to placate a god 
but to please a man,” charged one congressional member against Morales Bermúdez.4  
Early in 1894, Morales Bermúdez became ill and died. Second vice-president, Colonel 
Justiniano Borgoño, assumed the presidency, bypassing the civilian and pierolista first 
vice-president who resigned in light of several high officials’ refusal to recognize him 
as chief executive. In August, Cáceres initiated his second term of office.5 
In addition to strong civilista and pierolista opposition, Cáceres faced an 
economic crisis in his second term, which forced the government to raise taxes, and 
suffered diplomatic setbacks regarding Chile’s occupation of Tacna and Arica. All that, 
combined with his increasing and obvious illegal actions towards the opposition 
resulted in dwindling popular support.  By late 1894, several revolts had exploded 
throughout the country. The Civilista and Democratic parties formed the “National 
Coalition,” which Piérola led in a bloody civil war against Cáceres and the regular 
army. In March 1895, the Coalition’s army entered Lima to popular acclaim. During an 
armistice to assist the wounded and bury the dead, Cáceres agreed to withdraw. 
Although the regular army had not been defeated, he recognized the magnitude of the 
popular opposition to his regime. A junta governed the country until September when 
Nicolás de Piérola assumed the presidency. 6 
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Cáceres believed, as Castilla did, in the necessity of a strong army to maintain 
internal order. Like many officers since the war of independence, Cáceres attributed to 
the army a broader role in society due to the weakness of republican institutions, 
believing that “military virtue, resting essentially on a foundation of authority, 
discipline, courage and occasional stubbornness, was adequate to solve the ills of 
Peru.”7 After the War of the Pacific, it became urgent to consider national defense in 
light of two complementary goals: the development of a modern nation-state and the 
creation of a well- armed, professional military. Cáceres saw himself as the unselfish 
patriot who could accomplish such goals with the support of the microcosm of society, 
the army. 
By the 1880s, the army was a professionalizing occupation attempting to 
establish a jurisdiction, “a legitimate claim to apply its expertise to specific situations,” 
albeit a broad one.8 Since the early republic, several administrations had recognized the 
need to transform the military vocation into a profession, requiring full- time, trained 
officers and leaders who understood the rules and principles of the science of war. In 
March 1823, Riva Agüero, imposed by the first Peruvian military coup, approved the 
creation of the first military academy for cadets. The academy sought to end the custom 
that an officer would initiate his career without any prior training. The resolution that 
ordered its creation read, 
The art of war is not only the result of valor as the masses consider erroneously. This 
art is regulated by laws and principles that are theoretical as well as practical and need 
to be studied. . . This is already well known in civilized nations, which trust their 
national security only to officers who had started their careers with methodic study of 
the military profession. 9   
                                                 
7 Pike, Modern , 159. 
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9 Alfredo Muñoz, Las Escuelas Militares del Perú , 7. 
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Since Riva Agüero’s administration ended rapidly, this first academy never 
functioned. Santa Cruz’ attempts to establish a technical school for the enlisted 
personnel and a military academy for cadets while in charge of the government after 
Bolívar’s departure in 1826 suffered a similar fate. In 1830, Gamarra ordered the 
creation of a military academy for cadets that finally transcended the imagination of 
national leaders. The decree read that in the academy the youth with a military calling 
would “learn the principles and elements of the complicated science of war.” Cadets 
already in the army, along with males between fifteen and eighteen years of age who 
wished a commission, should attend the academy. However, because of political 
instability, the academy in 1834 closed “temporarily” for fifteen years.10 
When Castilla assumed the presidency in 1845, the armed forces remained 
regulated by the Spanish ordenanzas while cadets received from their unit officers 
“some theoretical instruction directed toward practical uses.” Despite congressional and 
military clamor for new regulations, the Military Code did not appear until 1865, but 
even then revolution frustrated its application. In January 1950, the academy, renamed 
Military Institute, opened its doors offering instruction for army and navy cadets. Each 
cadet had to pass a Spanish test and provide all his needed utensils. The institute closed 
temporarily due to the 1854 revolution, re-opening during 1859-1867.11 
In 1872, the civilista Pardo re-opened the Military School, which began the 
instruction of students between fourteen and seventeen years of age early next year. Its 
1878 charter established a three-year program for infantry and cavalry officers and a 
six-year program for artillery officers and those destined for the General Staff. Pardo 
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also established the Escuela de Clases, which prepared young men between fourteen 
and sixteen years of age as enlisted men; courses would last two or three-year 
depending on the arm. Both institutions functioned until the War of the Pacific. Cáceres 
re-opened the Escuela de Clases in 1888 and the Military School in 1890 until the 
Coalitionist revolution of 1895.12 
As the military institution struggled to professionalize, it formally claimed a 
broad jurisdiction after the War of the Pacific. Although the officer corps remained 
politicized and fractionalized during the nineteenth century due to caudillismo and 
patrimonial practices, army and navy officers shared a sense of broad military 
responsibility toward the country. The constitutional mandate entrusting the armed 
forces with the defense of the political system and the 1823 coup, which imposed Riva 
Agüero as necessary to the national conduct of the war of independence, gave to the 
armed forces an extra-military role in society. Whether patriotism, self- interest, or a 
combination of the two guided those 1823 officers and the later caudillos to revolt 
against constitutional or established authorities, by the 1880s military officers believed 
their role included political actions in defense of the nation’s interests.  
The lack of a civilian ruling class guiding the war of independence or 
establishing a state afterwards and the politicians’ use of military leaders as caudillos 
expanded the officers’ role. The weakness of civilian groups and institutions during the 
early republic facilitated the political intervention of military officers who justified their 
conduct in terms of national defense or military necessity, such as the 1823 coup. 
Besides, the people expected military officers to lead revolutions to protect the 
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“national” interest. Arequipa’s clamor for Vivanco in 1843 or Castilla’s support in 1854 
served as examples.  
The appointment of military men as prefects, which did not contradict the law, 
also propelled officers outside a strictly military sphere. As the highest authority in the 
departamentos, prefect-officers dealt with political, administrative, and developmental 
activities. In addition, the administration of the country, based on the Napoleonic model 
of organization, established a chain of command, that is, the lower official received his 
orders from his superior. In this light, “the prefect depended on the President of the 
Republic, the subprefect on the prefect, and the governor on the subprefect in a direct 
hierarchical relation.”13 The country’s administrative structure, paralleling that of an 
army, hinted, at least, at the appropriateness of military virtues in the conduction of 
national affairs. 
The weakness of civilian institutions and the liberal desire to “civilize” the 
Indian masses through education induced congress in 1825 to order the functioning of 
an elementary school in every unit of the army. Pardo’s Escuela de Clases, entrusted 
with the training of the army’s enlisted personnel, was also responsible for the 
instruction received by temporary recruits fulfilling their obligatory military service. 
The Escuela provided the recruits with additional classes directed toward increasing 
their work opportunities when returned to civilian life.14 During the first Cáceres 
administration, the Ministry of War in 1888 ordered the establishment of elementary 
and secondary schools in every army unit to ensure basic literacy and mathematical 
skills, as well as teach basic geometry, Spanish grammar, Peruvian his tory, geography, 
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and government along with target practice, notions of topography, and basic concepts of 
fortification. 15 “Today, each garrison is a school, where the soldier learns not only his 
duties toward the patria but to his family and God . . .,”the minister of war declared in 
an awards ceremony at the Escuela in December 1888. “The crude and ignorant soldier 
will be succeed by the citizen aware of his obligations; by the soldier, that useful 
element in the defense of the nation, its rights and liberties, who will not be easily 
dragged by sedition.”16 
Military officers had expanded the armed forces’ role through the channels of 
civilian approval or expectation of their involvement in politics, their actual 
performance of extra-military duties, and through a legal channel by the constitution 
entrusting the armed forces with the defense of the political system. The latter 
mechanism had led officers to accept political appointments as prefects and now, 
increasingly, it involved the establishment of military schools that performed the 
function of civilian elementary and vocational training. 
Although the officer class shared a broad sense of responsibility toward the 
country, that is, they believed in the legitimacy of an expanded military role in society, 
nineteenth-century officers had embraced different ideologies, usually fighting against 
each other. Despite the officer class factionalism and the questionable promotion 
process, army officers grasped their belonging to one national army. However true that 
military officers raised militias and montoneras independently during revolutions, some 
of which were incorporated into the regular army, generally, these units stood clearly as 
something separate from, although complementary to, the regular forces. The removal 
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of officers from the military roster after revolutions remained throughout the century as 
temporary setbacks since new revolutions, personal reconciliation, or amnesty laws 
reincorporated fallen officers.17  
Cáceres attempted the professionalization of the officer class by improving its 
expertise, corporateness, and discipline. The unification of the officer class would result 
from its acceptance of a military ideology that summarized the nineteenth century 
military experience and posited a broad military jurisdiction. The Centro Militar del 
Perú, systematized such ideology, disseminating it through its periodical, the Revista 
Militar y Naval, and its members’ control of the military schools. 
Established in 1888, the Centro, aggregated over 120 army and naval officers.18 
Its composition shows the connection of the Centro with Cáceres, his administrations, 
and his party. Colonel Remigio Morales Bermúdez, president of the Centro in 1888 and 
1889, was Cáceres vice-president from 1886 to 1890 winning the 1890 presidential 
elections as the Constitutional party nominee. Colonel Justiniano Borgoño, first vice-
president of the Centro in 1888 and 1889, had fought under Cáceres during the 
Wizard’s resistance campaign. Borgoño formed part of the Cáceres’ cabinet in 1886, 
1887, and 1889 becoming Morales Bermúdez’ second vice-president in 1890. After 
Morales’ death, prior to the 1894 presidential elections, Borgoño assumed the 
presidency, maneuvering to get Cáceres elected for a second term. 19  
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Colonel Rufino Torrico, second vice-president of the Centro in 1888, 
participated in Cáceres’ 1886, 1887, and 1894 cabinets.20 Navy Captain Manuel Melitón 
Carvajal, treasurer of the Centro in 1888, its second vice-president in 1889, and director 
of the Centro’s periodical in 1893, formed part of the 1891 and 1894 Bermúdez’ 
cabinets.21 Admiral Lizardo Montero and Lieutenant Colonel Manuel Eduardo Lecca 
were members of both the Centro and the Constitutional party. General Manuel Velarde 
also belonged to both the Centro and the Constitutional party and had participated in 
Cáceres’ 1886 cabinet and Morales’ 1893.22  
Colonel Guillermo Ferreyros, member of the Centro and the Constitutional 
party, held cabinet posts under Cáceres in 1889 and 1890. Ferreyros also functioned as 
secretary for the Borgoño transitional administration in 1894, between the death of 
president Morales Bermúdez and the election of Cáceres for a second presidential term. 
Another member, General Javier de Osma, was part of Cáceres’s cabinet in 1884 and 
1894.23 Colonel Francisco de Paula Secada, member of the Constitutional Party and the 
Centro had been commandant- in-chief of Cáceres’ resistance army during the War of 
Independence. In 1890, Paula y Secada became part of Cáceres’ cabinet.24 
Other members of the Centro linked the caceristas with the professionalization 
of the armed forces. Colonel Nicanor Ruiz de Somocurcio, member of the Centro, 
directed the Escuela de Clases – school for the enlisted personnel - from its reopening 
in 1888, after the war, until 1893 when Morales Bermúdez appointed him Secretary of 
War. Colonel Ernesto La Combe, who had been Cáceres’ engineer during the 
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resistance, and Sergeant Major Manuel Pío Alcalá, survivor of the Tarapacá campaign, 
both members of the Centro, functioned as sub-director and third chief of the Escuela, 
respectively.  Colonel Juan Norberto Eléspuru, also member of the Centro, directed the 
Military School for cadets from its opening in 1890 until 1894, when Piérola won the 
civil war that deposed Cáceres. 25 
The Centro published the Revista Militar y Naval from April 1888 to July 1893. 
Among the articles about new weaponry, improved vessels, military tactics, and foreign 
military organizations, the editors of the Revista dedicated many pages to defend the 
armed forces’ broad role in society while attempting, at the same time, to establish the 
Centro as the formal representative of the military institution. In the Revista’s first 
issue, the editors enunciated the mission of the Centro pledging “to represent the 
interests of the career of arms, make available modern professional knowledge, and 
encourage the practice of the military ethic” crucial in the betterment of the armed 
forces and the country’s defense.26 Two issues later, the editors argued that national 
stability and international prestige depended on the “efficient organization and 
development of the country’s military institutions.”27 
 One of the recurring themes in the Revista was the identification of the armed 
forces with the nation’s interests. This identification, claimed since the war of 
independence by military officers, intensified in the political context of 1888 when the 
Civilista Party and the Democratic Party initiated their campaigns for the 1890 
presidential elections. In an article titled “Antimilitarism,” Colonel Francisco de Paula 
Secada responded to those who called for the elimination of the army due to its cost, 
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questioned morality, and efficacy. After arguing the indispensability of the armed forces 
in matters of external and internal defense, Paula Secada rejected the idea of military 
responsibility for the disastrous War of the Pacific, blaming it on civilian politicians 
who allegedly had denied the funding and undermined military morale. “It is 
deplorable,” he exclaimed, “the way in which the congresses dealt with the army and 
the salaries of its members in the heated discussions about the national budget, the 
virulent diatribes and insults with which they overwhelmed the army and the military 
men, calling them leeches of the Nation.” He continued blaming congress and the 
country in general for Peru’s military decadence because once a revolutionary faction 
triumphed, the military officers who remained loyal to the legal government typically 
lost their commissions. Some military personnel had been part of the political turmoil, 
but they, he insisted, did not represent the army. In general, he concluded, military 
officers had played a progressive role as prefects and subprefects creating schools, 
dams, markets, roads, based on their diligence and zealous dedication. 28 
As the political campaign for the 1890 elections heated up, the Revista defended 
the military’s indispensable role in society and the view of the army as a microcosm of 
society. The section “Eco del Ejército” complaint about a well-coordinated effort to 
reduce the army to impotence. “In no other place would acts destined to weaken the 
career of arms, devoted to the defense and security of the State, be tolerated; moreover, 
such acts would be interpreted as treason.” The army represented the defender of the 
basic principle of Peru’s political system, he asserted. “Is this maybe the reason why the 
army is seen as an obstacle to the establishment of the republic in an opposite set of 
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principles, such as the predominance of some group or caste with an oligarchic 
tendency?”29 Such commentary alluded to the elitist tendencies of the Civilista Party, 
which had lost its popular appeal of the 1870s. 
In another issue, the “Eco del Ejército” conferred on the armed forces almost the 
same status as the other three branches of government. This interpretation of the 
military role resulted from the constitutional mandate that the armed forces should 
protect the political system by conserving internal order.30 “The army, as the first and 
most noble institution of the republic after the three powers that exercise sovereignty, 
believes that it has the duty to warn, with patriotism and zeal for the honor of the patria, 
of the dangers that threaten the country . . .” And one of those dangers, the journal 
suggested, was a congress composed of “unprepared” individuals “openly hostile” to 
the armed forces.31 
In following issues, the “Eco del Ejército” continued the warnings against 
civilian incapacity to deal with national security matters. “Those swindlers, shoddy 
acting politicians believe . . . that war can be undertaken without preparation.” 
However, the section also stressed the responsibility of the divided officer class in the 
weakness of the military institution. “If the officers and military leaders had remained 
united, understanding their duties toward the fatherland, the legal regime of the 
republic, and the military honor, as well as their personal interests, . . . those revolutions 
would not have triumphed, the constitutional regime would have been strengthened in 
the republic, and respect for the national institutions would have been followed by 
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prestige, credit, and power for the nation; and the army would be today surrounded of 
the respect and consideration it deserves as supporter of order, peace, and guarantees.”32 
The “Eco del Ejército” continued to call on the unity of the officer class, “[the 
army] should be constantly united, compact, solid, homogeneous . . . Our military men 
seduced by the compliments of the demagogues, the everlasting promoters of the 
civilian discords traduced in fratricide battles, in which the only blood running was the 
one of the military man in observance of bastard aspirations, of egotistical interests 
invoking social or political regeneration, these deluded military men helped the 
politicians to be reduced, before long, to the more complete oblivion, misery, and 
scoff.”33  
With such statements, the Revista attempted to stop caudillismo against the 
Constitutional Party’s control of the State. The armed forces should remain united under 
the chief executive. Cáceres, and the following military presidents, resorted to several 
authoritarian actions to suppress political opposition and win elections; however, they 
always kept the constitutional façade justifying their actions as necessary to maintain 
internal order. Consequently, Cáceres and his entourage manipulated the constitutional 
provision for regimes of exception while claiming legal and legitimate representation of 
the sovereign people.34  
Believing themselves the real patriotic sons of the nations, these military men 
engaged in a corrupt interpretation of the constitution to support increasing authoritarian 
measures. “Taking advantage of the peace it has procured to the country, [the army] is 
reorganizing and reinvigorating its discipline, morality, and spirit, establishing itself as 
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the strongest support and axle around which every regenerative movement has to rotate 
and what the competent, patriotic, and well intentioned men of state . . . will have to use 
to save this vessel, which the pusillanimous, those without temple of spirit or patriotic 
warmth in their hearts, cold by the contact with gold, and profoundly egotistical, believe 
to go to pique without remedy and are snatching its contents.”35 
Nevertheless, not all members of the Centro or the Constitutional Party agreed 
with the vision of Cáceres, Bermúdez, and Borgoño. In December 1890, during the 
Bermúdez administration, Colonel Arturo Morales Toledo, member of the Centro, led 
an unsuccessful revolt, which the government attributed to pierolista maneuvers. In 
1893, Cáceres proclaimed his presidential candidacy for the following year, so 
Bermúdez cracked down on the press in an effort to undermine the political opposition. 
Early in 1893, the cabinet led by Carlos M. Elías, member of the Constitutional Party, 
abruptly resigned for reasons that remained unclear; then in May, Manuel Velarde, 
member of both the Centro and the Constitutional Party, resigned along with his 
cabinet, citing a conflict of opinions about “the way the official action should be 
guided.”36 
Late in 1891, the officer Gabriel Velarde Alvarez published two articles in the 
Revista, which formally attributed the army a civilizing role some five years before the 
first French mission set foot in the country. 37 Although Lyautey’s “Do Role social de 
l’officier,” which appeared in March 1891, might have influenced Velarde, the army 
had performed an educational role in Peru throughout the century. As Nicolás de Piérola 
put it, “the army had to be in Peru an important and efficient agent of civilization for the 
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great majority of our population.”38 In 1904, then Lieutenant Colonel Gabriel Velarde 
Alvarez would write “Civil Instruction of the Soldier” in the Boletín del Ministerio de 
Guerra y Marina, offering a positive evaluation of the civilizing effect of the army in its 
Indian conscripts.39 Frederick M. Nunn and Daniel M. Masterson cite this 1904 article 
as “early” proofs of Francophile Peruvian officers aping their teachers’ doctrines.40 
In 1891, Velarde Alvarez published in the Revista an article title “The Necessity 
of a Military Spirit in the Army.” The main task, he said, was the urgent 
professionalization of the army through education, unity, and discipline. And the nation 
should support that effort, he declared, because the military men were sentinels of 
Peru’s vital interests, a civilizing force within the national society. Indeed, “thousands 
have awaken from the lethargy caused by their ignorance as a result of the continued 
contact with comrades already civilized, the change of scenery, and the learning of the 
Spanish language and the elementary teachings given at the garrisons . . .”41 
Velarde Alvarez took up that same theme in a subsequent article stressing the 
army’s contribution to the integration of the Indians into national society. “Is there any 
other corporation that contributes more to the education of the population?” he asked 
rhetorically. “Who has taken charge of their education and civilization? No one, only an 
institution slandered by those who fear it or do not understand it. If the army has been 
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corrupted sometimes, as any other, in exchange it has delivered great goods to the 
country.”42 
In this way, the military mind of the post-1879 war stressed the ever-present 
internal and external dangers threatening the nation, the urgency of developing a 
powerful military institution, the importance of order and hierarchy, the supremacy of 
society over the individual, and a role for the armed forces beyond strictly military 
affairs. The military broad jurisdiction included administrative, nation-building, and 
constitutional guardian roles. 
It is thus clear that before the process of professionalization intensified in 1896 
under French influence, the Peruvian military mind consisted of attitudes and 
perspectives that  attributed to the armed forces a broad responsibility in society, 
including a civilizing one. Such broad responsibility originated in the nineteenth-
century political culture, which interpreted constitutional notions through traditional 
lenses and a “direct democracy” logic. Expanded and refined during the twentieth 
century by French and North American influence, this Peruvian military mind remained 
essentially unchanged, justifying the military’s twentieth-century political interventions 
and the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Velarde, “The Army as the Civilization School for our Indians,” RMN 89 (15 November 1891), 2072-
73. 
 67
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
From 1896 until WWII, the Peruvian army underwent a steady process of 
professionalization under French tutelage. New regulations modernized the military 
institution while military schools elevated the personnel’s level of expertise and 
corporate sense. French military doctrines, in tune with the nineteenth-century Peruvian 
military mind, incorporated into the army’s professional ideology a broad social role. 
Following nineteenth-century tradition, political factions turned to military 
support to remain in or gain power during the 1900s. However, the politicization and 
fractionalization in the officer corps did not reach the alarming levels of the prior 
century due, in part, to the development of an independent military ideology, which 
synthesized nineteenth-century military experience, French teachings, and North 
American “civic action” postulates. This military ideology linked national defense to 
nation-building, including economic development. It followed, therefore, that the army, 
which supposedly embodied all the civic virtues and was a reservoir of expertise, should 
play a leading role in that developmental effort.  pending projects as intertwined with 
national defense. In the midst of economic decline, popular mobilizations, and 
denunciations of governmental actions against national interests, General Juan Velasco 
Alvarado, commandant of the Joint Command, inaugurated the Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces in 1968. This long-term regime attempted to impose 
from above the structural reforms necessary for stability and progress, following the 
mandate of the contradictory Peruvian political culture: only authoritarianism can 
protect republican and liberal notions. 
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Nineteenth-century militarism is crucial to understanding Peruvian civil-military 
relations and military political involvement during the twentieth century. Indeed, it was 
the Era of the Caudillos that gave birth to the modern Peruvian military mind. The lack 
of cohesion among the Peruvian elite before, during, and after the war of independence 
along with the emergent political culture set the stage for the instability of the 
nineteenth century, which nurtured caudillismo. Criollo regional and ideological 
divergences impeded the formation of a ruling class capable of replacing the king’s 
legitimating power with a constitution, while the republican language supported an 
elitist, antidemocratic discourse where the idea of “nation” and “people” 
asymmetrically incorporated different social groups. 
The political vacuum and crisis of legitimacy following the war of independence 
encouraged unregulated political competition transforming caudillo violence into an 
essential part of politics. Each contending faction claimed to represent public opinion 
against the abuses of the group in power, using the notion of popular sovereignty within 
a “direct democracy” logic to justify revolutions. Political violence reduced the 
legitimacy of any representative government, leaving unanswered the question of who 
represented the sovereign people. Military officers claimed that the army was the best 
representative of the people because it was a microcosm of society upholding the 
perfect balance between equality and order, tradition and modernity.   
Moreover, since Peruvian cons titutions employed competing set of principles 
when establishing regimes of exception and designating the armed forces as defenders 
of the political system and internal order, president-caudillos and revolutionaries 
equally claimed to fulfill their constitutional duties when resorting to authoritarian 
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measures against political opposition or when leading revolts against established 
authorities. 
A broad sense of responsibility toward the country, along with desires for 
personal glory and power as well as different ideologies of what was best for the 
country, encouraged military officers to participate in politics. Peruvian officers saw 
themselves as the founding fathers of the republic called to protect it from anarchy. 
Caudillismo encouraged the formation of a hybrid state utilizing modern 
bureaucratic and traditional patrimonial practices. The control of the State by a 
contending faction depended on the construction and maintenance of alliances that 
could provide capital, men, supply, and “popular support” during revolts and civil wars. 
Consequently, prefects, controlling the departamentos, became key political players. 
Most prefects were military officers who obtained such posts from the president of the 
republic as a reward for proven or expected loyalty. Most caudillos who ruled the 
country had held previously a prefecture and, although they manipulated governmental 
institutions, they did not control them completely. In this way, caudillos’ power, based 
on shifting alliances, faced constant challenges keeping the states they built extremely 
vulnerable. 
The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) weakened the civilian sectors, which had 
emerged in the 1860s and 1870s overcoming the liberal-conservative dichotomy, giving 
way to militarism reminiscent of the early repub lic. However, this second militaristic 
moment sprang from a defeat originating in Peru’s failure at nation-building. 
General Andrés Avelino Cáceres, hero of the war, attempted to rule the country 
through his Constitutional Party and the support of the army, transformed into a 
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homogeneous political pressure group to deter caudillismo. The saviors of the 
fatherland’s honor, the microcosm of society, should lead the country’s regeneration 
process united under a military ideology that placed the nation above all else.  
Although the Peruvian nineteenth-century military did not possess a strong 
corporate sense, a high level of expertise or an ideology placing it under civilian 
control, military practitioners believed their occupation to be in a professionalizing 
state. Moreover, they formally claimed a broad jurisdiction based on the century’s 
military experience as prefects, educators, and guardians of the constitution and the 
nation’s interests. 
Cáceres and his entourage embodied the Peruvian military mind, systematized 
and spread by the Centro Militar del Perú and its Revista Militar y Naval (1888-1893). 
The Revista dedicated many pages to the defense of a broad military role in society, 
arguing that national interests were undistinguishable from those of the armed forces. 
Before the advent of French instructors in 1896, the Peruvian military mind 
already consisted of attitudes and perspectives that stressed the necessity of a strong 
military, the supremacy of society over the individual, the destructiveness of civilian 
partisan politics, and a broad military jurisdiction, which included administrative, 
nation-building, civilizing, and constitutional guardian functions. 
The roots of modern Peru’s professional militarism thus lay deep in the 
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